Protest Cycles and Political
Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age DAVID S. MEYER, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have consistently protested both the content of United States national security policy, and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however, has concern about nuclear weapons spread beyond these relatively marginal groups, generated substantial public support, and reached mainstream political institutions. In this paper, I use histories of peace protest and analyses of the inside of these social movements and theoretical work on protest cycles to explain cycles of movement engagement and quiescence in terms of their relation to external political context, or the "structure of political opportunity." I begin with a brief review of the relevant literature on the origins of movements, noting parallels in the study of interest groups. Building on recent literature on political opportunity structure, I suggest a theoretical framework for understanding the lifecycle of a social movement that emphasizes the interaction between activist choices and political context, proposing a six-stage process through which challenging movements develop. Using this theoretical framework I examine the four cases of relatively broad antinuclear weapons mobilization in postwar America. I conclude with a discussion of movement cycles and their relation to political alignment, public policy, and institutional politics. Helen Caldicott (1984: 13) demise; the organizations that had carried the movement were in financial and/or organizational crises, or moving on to other issues. This despite the fact that both superpowers still possessed some tens of thousands of nuclear weapons -easily capable of destroying the world -and the problems of nuclear proliferation had increased. This paper is concerned less with why Caldicott and a number of other dedicated activists have been able to maintain their commitments and activity, than with why the movements they participated in have fluctuated so dramatically.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age small groups of activists have consistently protested both the content of United States national security policy, and the process by which it is made. Only occasionally, however, has concern about nuclear weapons spread beyond these relatively marginal groups, generated substantial public support, and reached mainstream political institutions. Historians and analysts of specific campaigns have been able to identify the proximate causes of the rise and decline of particular movements, noting both the political context and activist decisions, but rarely do they attempt to discern more general explanations for the phenomenon of social movement cycles. More recently, a few analysts have recognized and commented on the sporadic nature of peace movement engagement (Boyer 1985; Kleidman 1993; Mushaben 1985; Wittner 1988) (Smelser 1963) (Olson 1965) .
In political science, analysis of interest group origins developed in a similar manner, albeit with important normative differences. Truman (1951) argued that interest groups reflected and arose from &dquo;disturbances&dquo; produced by new constituencies or problems. In contrast to the collective behavior school, however, Truman and other pluralist analysts (e.g., Dahl 1963) viewed the development of groups as a social good, reflecting a healthy democratic polity. Critics quickly noted, however, that all disturbances were not equally likely to create interest groups, that the political system advantaged certain constituencies and problems (Bacharach and Baratz 1970; Schattschneider 1960) , and that elite support was critical to a group's emergence (Walker 1983 (Walker , 1991 , especially for groups that pursued various visions of the public interest (Berry 1977; McFarland 1984 (Salisbury 1969 Most recently, students of both interest groups and social movements have recognized the essentially political character of extra-institutional dissent, and its relationship to institutional political activity. In a study of challenging groups in America before World War II, Gamson (1990) found that the structure of United States political institutions advantaged certain constituencies and strategies of influence. Jenkins and Perrow (1977) identified the critical role elite supporters played in aiding and amplifying recurrent farmworker campaigns. Freeman (1975) emphasized the important role that public policy played in the tactics women's rights activists chose; similarly Hansen (1985) (Eisinger 1973) , states (Amenta and Zylan 1991) , or nations (Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978) , POS refers to the institutional and political factors that shape social movement options. To date, analysts have described a broad range of aspects of political opportunity as structure. Summarizing this work, Tarrow (1988: 430) (Hirschman 1982) , the intractability of social problems (Downs 1972) , or macrohistorical patterns in history (Schlesinger 1986 ). Tarrow (1989) People naturally and rationally seek the most direct lines of influence they believe possible (Downs 1957 (As a result, the incentive to participate at lowest levels also diminishes.)
Even though the decision about whether and how to participate is rational, the information one considers in making it is socially constructed. The urgency of an issue, the viability of various policy alternatives, the range of available froms of collective action (Tilly 1978) , and the likely efficacy of alternative tactics are all subject to manipulation by government, activists, and other interested parties (Edelman 1971; Gamson 1988; Ryan 1991) .
The American polity was designed as a self-righting and stable system that allows relatively easy access to a wide variety of groups and individuals, but strictly limits the influence any group can have on policy. Historically, successful challenging groups have emphasized entrance to and legitimation within the political system, rather than either substantive or structural changes (Gamson 1990) . As a result, the process of social mobilization has cyclical elements, as extra-institutional mobilization gives way to organization-building and institutionalization. Established organizations routinize their behavior to ensure organizational maintenance and stability (Walker 1991 (Wittner 1984 (Miller 1985) , but clearly it is not so much base mass opinion that changes, but rather the intensity of concern and policy preferences, and the strategic political choices dissidents make. (Huntington 1961: 35 (Boyer 1985 (Ellsberg 1983: 277-78 (Robinson 1986 ).
Muste also helped raise money for a more dramatic trespass effort, pacifist Albert Bigelow's (1959) (Herken 1987: 186 (Katz 1986: 129) . Unable to achieve their goals through conventional politics, institutionallyoriented scientists turned to mass politics, trying to spur dissident activism in service of policy goals they had already defined.
Upon his election, President Nixon proposed accelerated ABM development to defend both US weapons and major metropolitan areas, essentially ignoring ABM opponents. This engendered a wave of activism among both atomic scientists who doubted the wisdom and feasibility of such systems, and local residents who opposed deployment of nuclear weapons near their homes. Activists sponsored teach-ins and rallies in cities where ABMs were to be deployed, including Chicago, Seattle, and As the movement made inroads in institutional politics the freeze coalition began to fray (Meyer 1993b (Fascell 1987 
